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Cohen: Prepaid Income for Future Services: When May Accrual Basis Taxpay
PREPAID INCOME FOR FUTURE SERVICES:
WHEN MAY AN ACCRUAL BASIS TAXPAYER
UTILIZE THE DEFERRAL TECHNIQUE?
INTRODUCTION

"It is essential that the income tax laws be brought into harmony with
generally accepted accounting principles."1
This call for conformity of the rules governing tax and financial accounting
ironically was made by the Senate Finance Committee in 1955 after retroactively repealing section 452, the first Code section to incontestably allow the
standard financial accounting practice, deferral of inclusion in income, until
earned, of payments for services to be rendered in the future by an accrual
method taxpayer. 2 The Senate committee's goal of attaining the above conformity in the area of prepaid income has not been achieved. The Internal
Revenue Service and the government have consistently attempted to treat payments for future services as income recognized at the time of receipt.3 Conflict
between these attempts and Congress' expressed goal of conforming tax accounting with standard financial accounting has involved the Supreme Court
in a confusing battle. As a result of limitations set by three Supreme Court
cases (the Trilogy),4 the Commissioner has restricted availability of the deferral

method by accrual method taxpayers. Recently, however, a federal district
court narrowly interpreted the Trilogy to allow greater utilization of the deferral method.5 Although reversed on appeal, 6 the district court's suggestions
cast new light on the Commissioner's interpretation of the Trilogy.
This article discusses the accrual accounting method and its relation to in1. S. REp. No. 372, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955), reprinted in 1955-2 C.B. 858 [hereinafter S. REP.].
2. Section 452 came into law as part of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. Congress
recognized that "under present law" prepayments for future services were includible in the
year of receipt, despite well-established accounting procedure that permitted income to be
recognized as earned. Section 452 was enacted to allow the deferral of these prepayments
until the years in which, under the taxpayer's deferral accounting method, the income is
earned. However, the period over which the prepayments were allowed to be deferred
could not exceed five years after the year of receipt. Where such "earning period" exceeded
five years, taxpayers could elect to ratably defer the prepayment over the period of time taxable
year of receipt and the five succeeding taxable years. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
62 (1954), General Report on § 452. Section 452, enacted in 1954, was retroactively repealed
one year later by Congress in Pub. L. No. 84-74, 69 Stat. 134 (June 15, 1955). The effect of its
repeal is discussed infra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
3. RCA Corp. v. United States, 664 F.2d 881, 888 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2958 (1982).
4. Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); American Auto. Ass'n v. United States,
367 U.S. 687 (1961); Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
5. RCA Corp. v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 881 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 2958 (1982).
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come deferral. Past treatment of deferral for tax purposes is reviewed, culminating in a discussion of the Trilogy's restriction of the deferral method. By
examining the federal district court's interpretive suggestions, conclusions can
be drawn as to the Trilogy's proper and most beneficial interpretation in light
of the aims of tax accounting and, specifically, the deferral method.
ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING FOR FINANCIAL PURPOSES:
DEFERRING PAYMENTS RECEIVED FOR FUTURE SERVICES

The accrual method of accounting recognizes and reports revenues as income in the period the expenses generating those revenues are incurred, or
stated differently, as the revenues are "earned." 7 This "matching" procedure is
the conceptual hub of accrual accounting." Matching revenues and related
expenses accurately reflects, for business purposes, net earnings for the period.
Payments for future services are recognized as income when the services are
rendered. The mere receipt of money for future services does not constitute
income in the period of receipt, since such receipt is burdened with an obligation to render services in the future.9 The accrual method therefore recognizes
income only when it is earned or the right to receive it is fixed, irrespective of
when the payment is ultimately received. 10
The most common application of accrual accounting involves the deferral
of income recognition. Prepayments received are allocated to a liability account,
typically entitled deferred or unearned income, which reflects the taxpayer's
obligation to perform future services. As the services are rendered and expenses incurred, a proportionate amount of the prepayment is deemed earned
and recognized as income for that period with a corresponding decrease in
the liability account. The costs of services generating the revenues are accounted for when the revenue is recognized, consistent with the matching
concept. While the above procedure accurately describes standard financial
accounting practice, deferred income recognition traditionally has been
treated differently for tax purposes.
ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING FOR TAX PUROSES: JUDICIAL
AND CONGRESSIONAL ACCEPTANCE

Prior to the Revenue Act of 1916, income for tax purposes was reported
solely by the cash receipts and disbursements accounting method."1 The 1916
Act, however, expanded the section defining permissible accounting methods
6. 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2958 (1982).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1960).

8. See Crumbley, How Long Will the Commissioner and the Courts Ignore Accounting
Standards On the Accrual of Prepaid Income?, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 559, 559 (1969). See also
AICPA, AccoUNTING PRINCIPLES (CCH) § 1026.12-28 (1971).
9. Jacobs, Changing Attitudes Toward Accrual Concepts, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAx

579 (1958).
10. Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697, 699 (10th Cir. 1955). The
Tenth Circuit's statement of the accrual concept's operation referred to accrual accounting
for both financial and tax purposes.
11. See generally Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 11(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167.
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to allow a taxpayer, with Treasury approval, to file a tax return on any accounting basis that "clearly reflects" the taxpayer's income.12 Congress de3
signed this revision specifically to permit accrual accounting for tax purposes.'
Although the Revenue Act of 1918 subsequently removed the necessity of obtaining special approval to use the accrual method,' 4 the general provision permitting accrual reporting remained otherwise unchanged for thirty-six years. 15
Finally, in 1954, the provision was changed to specifically permit the accrual
method. 6
In the historic 1926 case of United States v. Anderson,17 the Supreme Court
approved accrual accounting for tax purposes. The Court held that a munitions
tax applicable to an accrual taxpayer's 1916 operations accrued and was required to be deducted in 1916, rather than in 1917 when actually paid.'8 In
applying the accrual method for tax purposes, the Court accepted the matching concept as its guidepost, explaining that the 1916 statutory change enabled
taxpayers to utilize scientific accounting principles by charging expenses against
corresponding income earned during the taxable period.' 9
Clearly after Anderson no disparity existed between accrual accounting for
financial purposes and for tax purposes. As the Court stated, the accrual
method was a statutorily recognized accounting method.2 0 At this stage in the
12. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 13(d), 39 Stat. 756, 771. The pertinent portion of the
Act provides:
[K]eeping accounts upon any basis other than that of actual receipts and disbursements, unless such other basis does not clearly reflect its income, may, subject to
regulations made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury, make its return upon the basis upon which its accounts
are kept....
See also id. ch. 463, § 8(g), 39 Stat. 763.
13. See H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1916), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 22, 24.
14. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 212(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1064-65.
15. See Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 1, § 41, 53 Stat. 1, 24.
16. I.R.C. § 446(c) (1976) provides as follows:
(c) Permissible Methods - Subject to the provisions of subsections (a) and (b), a
taxpayer may compute taxable income under any of the following methods of accounting (1) the cash receipts and disbursements method,
(2) an accrual method,
(3) any other method permitted by this chapter, or
(4) any combination of the foregoing methods permitted under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary.
(emphasis added). Accrual accounting does not merely defer the timing of income recognition.
Income recognition is determined by the right to receive and not the actual receipt of the
income. United States v. Harmon, 205 F.2d 919, 920 (10th Cir. 1953). Therefore, if accrual
taxpayer X renders services to Y in year one and bills him accordingly, but does not receive
payment until year two, X recognizes income in year one, when the right to receive it first
arises.
17. 269 U.S. 422 (1926).
18. Id. at 440.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 441.
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relationship between accrual accounting and tax law, it appeared an accrual
basis taxpayer could defer inclusion of income for future services until such
services were in fact rendered. 2' What then happened to this apparent rapport
between taxpayers and the Treasury in the application of generally accepted
accounting principles? One commentator suggests the government simply
adopted an opportunistic taxation philosophy of taxing as income whatever
it could, whenever it could, irrespective of the taxpayer's method of accounting
or any principle of consistency.2 2 This new philosophy was reflected in the
government's application of "claim of right" doctrine.
The "Claim of Right" Doctrine
The claim of right doctrine has its roots in North American Oil Consolidated v. Commissioner,23 decided by the Supreme Court six years after
Anderson. In North American Oil, the taxpayer in 1916 operated a section of
oil land legally owned by the United States.2 4 The government also claimed

beneficial ownership of the land and, after the institution of legal proceedings,

had a receiver appointed to operate the property and hold the net income.
Pursuant to court decree, the receiver paid the net profits earned -from 1916
'operations to the taxpayer in 1917.25 The government appealed, but lost at

26
the circuit court of appeal.
The income earned from 1916 operations was entered on the taxpayer's
books in 1916 and included in an amended return for that year filed in 1918.27
Upon audit, the Commissioner determined the income in question was taxable in 1917. The taxpayer alternatively contended the income was taxable in
1916, or in 1922 when ownership of the impounded property was awarded to
the taxpayer. 28 The Court first held the net profits were not taxable in 1916,
since the taxpayer had no right in that year to demand the receiver pay over
the money.29 The Court, noting uncertainty as to whether the taxpayer was
on the cash or accrual accounting basis, held the particular method used it-

21. The Service, in two early rulings, seemed to agree. In the first ruling, an accrual
taxpayer sold tickets for tourist cruises and received payments therefore late in one taxable
year. The expense incident to running the cruise was not incurred until the succeeding'year.
The Service determined that only the accrual method of accounting would clearly reflect
income, and permitted deferral of the receipts from ticket sales until the succeeding taxable
year. I.T. 2080, 111-2 C.B. 48 (1924). In the second ruling, the Service permitted accrual basis
publishers of periodicals to report prepaid subscription income over the subscription period,
which extended beyond the taxable year of receipt, where publishers had consistently
followed that practice. I.T. 3369, 1940-1 C.B. 46.
22. See Jacobs, supra note 9, at 583.

23. 286 US. 417 (1932).
24. Id. at 420.
25. Id. at 421.
26. Commissioner v. North Am. Oil Consol., 50 F. 752,-756 (9th Cir. 1921).
27. 286 US. at 421.
28. Id. See United States v. North Am. Oil Consol., 242 F. 723 (S.D. Cal.,1917), aff'd 26'4 F.
336 (9th Cir. 1920), appeal dismissed, 258 US. 633 (1922).
29. 286 U.. at 422-24.
-
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relevant. The taxpayer was not liable in 1916 for income it had not yet received and might never receive.30

The Court responded to the taxpayer's argument that the amounts received in 1917 were not taxable until 1922 with the now famous claim of right
doctrine.
If a taxpayer received earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required
to report, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled
to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable
to restore its equivalent.31
The Court labeled earnings received under a claim of right without disposition restrictions as recognizable income.3 2 Even if later found not entitled
to the earnings and compelled to restore its equivalent, the taxpayer must disclose the amount as income. 33 The claim of right doctrine formulated in North
American Oil responded to the issue of whether amounts, otherwise includible
as income in a particular year under the taxpayer's accounting method, should
be recognized in that year when their ownership is disputed. The Supreme
Court was not referring to prepayment for which future services were owed.
The funds in question were admittedly income under the taxpayer's accounting method, not mere receipts.
After North American Oil, lower courts unfortunately applied the claim
of right doctrine to force accrual basis taxpayers to include prepayments for
future services in the year of receipt. The criterion for applying the doctrine
became the presence or absence of a use restriction on the prepaid receipts.
Courts overlooked the fact that under the accrual method the receipts were
not yet income. 34 By so interpreting North American Oil, lower courts ignored
the Supreme Court's reference to earnings and net profits, because payments
for future services are neither when received by an accrual taxpayer. The better
view would require the amounts in question to be otherwise includible under
the taxpayer's accounting method as a precondition to the doctrine's application. 5
These courts arguably misapplied the "restriction on use" test. Restrictions
on disposition or use need not be specifically stated in a contract, nor must the
receipts in question actually be set aside to be restricted. Common sense
dictates a taxpayer receiving payment for future services must retain sufficient
funds to pay the costs of rendering those services. As the Supreme Court
30. Id. at 424.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. See Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1956), aff'd
on other grounds, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); Capital Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 171 F.2d 395
(8th Cir. 1948); Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1943); South
Dade Farms v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943); New Capital Hotel v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 706 (1957); Andrews v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 1026 (1955); Your Health Club.
Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 385 (1944).
35. See Gelfand, The "Claim of Right" Doctrine, 33 TAx~m 726, 728 (1955).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1982

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [1982], Art. 6

1982]

PREPAID INCOME

stated in 1934, for receipts to be taxable the taxpayer must be "under no restriction, contractual or otherwise, as to its disposition, use or enjoyment."3 6
This statement indicates that practical business requirements may constitute
a restriction sufficient to prevent the claim of right doctrine from forcing inclusion of prepayments in income when they must be earned by future services.
Beginning in 1955, courts began to recognize that the claim of right doctrine
did not support the Commissioner's argument against deferred reporting of
prepayments by accrual taxpayers. The Tenth Circuit in Beacon Publishing
Co. v. Commissioner37 held the doctrine only applies when determining the
treatment of an amount otherwise includible in income whose ownership is
disputed.3 8 The court recognized that the doctrine does not address the
different issue of whether amounts undisputably owned by the taxpayer may
be reported in other than the taxable year of receipt under the accrual
method. 39 Because the doctrine's application would destroy the matching
concept which is intrinsic to the accrual method, the court allowed prepaid
sums received for newspaper subscriptions to be reported over unexpired subscription periods. 40 Within five years of Beacon Publishing, three other
circuits4 used the same rationale to reject the government's application of
claim of right to payments for future services to be rendered by an accrual
taxpayer.
The Supreme Court's Trilogy of decisions concerning deferral of prepayments settled the issue of claim of right's applicability to an accrual taxpayer's
prepaid receipts. 42 In all three cases the Court, although referring to claim
of right, turned to the statutory guidance of section 446(b) in determining
the validity of a deferral system. 43 As the Trilogy developed, fueled by an-enthusiastic rejection of the doctrine by legal commentators,4 it became apparent
claim of right had been replaced by section 446(b)'s dear reflection of income
test.
"Clearly Reflects" Income- Section 446(b)
The 1916 Revenue Act, which first permitted accrual accounting, limited
36. Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193, 199 (1934).
37. 218 F.2d 697 (1oth Cir. 1955).
38. Id. at 699-700.
89. Id. at 700.
40. Id. at 701-02.
41. See, e.g., Schlude v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.
1959); Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.d 722 (5th Cir. 1956).
42. The dissent in American Auto. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 367 U.S. 687 (1961), character-

ized the majority's failure to rely on the doctrine in Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 187 (1961), and AAA as a rejection of the doctrine's applicability to prepaid
receipts of accrual taxpayers. 367 U.S. at 693. The majority's silence in Michigan and AAA,
coupled with expressed reservations concerning the correctness of Beacon Publishing,support
the dissent's conclusions. See Michigan, 353 U.S. at 189; AAA, 367 U.S. at 691. See also infra
notes 53-82 and accompanying text.
43. Schlude, 372 U.S. at 136-37; AAA, 367 U.S. at 690; Michigan, 353 US. at 188.
44. See, e.g., Gelfand, supra note 35; Jacobs, supra note 9; Wolder, Deduction of Reserves
for FutureExpenses and Deferring of PrepaidIncome, 84 TAxcs 524 (1956).
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the deferral method's use. Accrual was statutorily permissible unless it did not
clearly reflect income.4 5 This statutory requirement was the forerunner of
section 446(b). Because prior to Beacon Publishingand the Trilogy, the Commissioner consistently won deferral cases by applying the claim of right doctrine,
courts found it unnecessary to determine whether deferral clearly reflected income. As a result, whether section 446(b) applied to the deferral area was unknown.
Read literally, section 446(b) is somewhat confusing. It expressly grants the
Commissioner discretion to choose an alternative accounting method once the
determination has been made that the taxpayer's method does not clearly reflect income. 46 The statute does not explicitly state who is to make the latter
determination. While the regulations empower the Commissioner to make the
decision, 7 this statutory ambiguity allows one to question if the Commissioner's
discretion to determine whether an accounting method clearly reflects income
is narrower than his authority to mandate a new accounting method. 41 The
absence of pre-Trilogy case law applying section 446(b) to deferral accounting
left in doubt the extent of the Commissioner's section 446(b) discretion.
THE TRILOGY

By applying section 446(b) to the deferral area, the Court's Trilogy
hammered the last nail into the claim of right coffin and redefined the issue.
The question became whether deferral accounting clearly reflects income. In
each case the Court upheld the Commissioner's determination that each
system did not clearly reflect income as a valid exercise of his section 446(b) discretion. Afterwards, the Commissioner asserted the Trilogy vested him with
45. See supra note 13.
46. I.R.C. § 446(b) (1976) reads as follows: "(b) Exceptions- If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect
income, the computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the
opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income." Id.
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (1960) ("[N]o method of accounting is acceptable unless,
in the opinion of the Commissioner, it clearly reflects income.').
48. For an excellent discussion concerning the extent of the Commissioner's discretionary
power over taxpayers' accounting methods, see Goodhue, Claim of Right and Changes in Accounting Method, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAX 209, 216-21 (1960). Although this article
predates two-thirds of the Trilogy, the author's conclusion seems to still have merit:
It is probably too late to deny that the Commissioner has considerable discretion
in laying down rules for determining when specific items of income should be reported
and specific deductions should be allowed. It is probably also too late to deny that
the Commissioner, where the taxpayer has chosen an accounting method which does
not conform to his rules, has discretion to require a much higher degree of proof from
the taxpayer that his method does clearly reflect income, than might be the case where
no specific rules or regulations have been laid down. There remains considerableforce to
the argument that if the taxpayer can sustain such a burden and prove convincingly
that its method clearly reflects income, it is an abuse of the Commissioner's discretion
to require the taxpayer to abandon his method in favor of the Commissioner's method,
unless the latter's is demonstrably better.
Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
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sufficiently broad discretion to reject any deferral -accounting method. Later
courts have debated whether this represents an accurate interpretation of the
Trilogy. 49 From these cases, three competing viewpoints have evolved. First,
section 446(b) and the congressional intent evidenced by the repeal of prodeferral section 452 vest the Commissioner with sufficiently broad discretion
to reject any deferral method.50 Second, deferral accounting dearly reflects
income via the performance of services on fixed future dates 1 Third, the
existence of fixed future performance dates is a significant, but not determinative, factor in deciding whether "accurate matching" is achieved. Statistical
projections of the customer demand for future services, if reasonably precise,
are sufficient to achieve the requisite "accurate matching."52 The decisions
promoting these viewpoints must be closely examined to determine which
viewpoint best characterizes the Supreme Court's intent.
Michigan
The Supreme Court first addressed the validity of deferral by accrual taxpayers in 1957 in Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner.5 The
petitioner in Michigan received membership dues paid one year in advance.
The club then recognized the prepaid dues as income ratably over the twelve
month membership period. To the extent the membership period extended into
the next taxable year, taxation on a portion of the prepayment was deferred.54
The Service contended that payments received under a claim of right without
disposition restrictions should be reported as income in the year of receipt. 5
Ignoring the claim of right doctrine, the Court analyzed the particulars of
the deferral system and decided it did not dearly reflect income.56 Accordingly,
the Commissioner was held to have acted within the bounds of his section
446(b) discretion in rejecting the system. 57 The Court found that the pro rata
allocation of prepaid dues was purely artificial and bore no relation to future
services that may or may not be rendered.5 8
On this basis alone, the Court might have appeared to reject the taxpayer's deferral method because it did not achieve the accurate matching of
revenues and related expenses that is basic to accrual accounting. This interpretation implies the Court would be receptive to a realistic deferral method
that accurately matched revenues and expenses. The Court, however, in foot49. See, e.g., Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1970);
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 585 F.2d 988 (Ct. C1. 1978); Boise Cascade Corp.
v. Commissioner, 530 F.2d 1367 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976).
50. See supra note 2.
51. See infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
52. RCA Corp. v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 507 (S.DN.Y.), rev'd, 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2958 (1982).
53. 353 US. at 180.
54. Id. at 188.
55. Id. at 188-89.
56. Id. at 189.
57. Id. at 189-90.
58. Id. at 189.
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note twenty5" reserved comment on the correctness of two cases60 permitting
deferral based on fixed future dates of service performance. Distinguishing
those cases, the Court recognized that in the instant case performance of
services remained contingent on a member's demand and therefore was not
related to fixed future dates."' This footnote may have meant the Commissioner
could reject any method that defers recognition of prepaid income for services
not to be rendered on fixed future dates without abusing his discretion.
The question left uncleac by Michigan was whether the Court required a
deferral system to achieve accurate or exact matching of revenues and related
expenses in order to clearly reflect income. Did the Court intend for its textual
requirement that deferral "bear a relation" to future services to control? Such
a requirement is satisfied when revenues are accurately matched with the expenses incurred incident to generating those revenues. Or did the Court's footnote modify the textual passage so as to require that the services be performed
on fixed future dates? If this is the proper interpretation, no uncertainty as
to the extent of future services is tolerated; revenues are exactly matched with
related expenses due to the specificity of time and extent of future services.
Rendition of services solely upon customer demand would not constitute a
sufficient basis for deferral under the latter interpretation, as the extent of
future services to be rendered is uncertain.
Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner62 was the first post-Michigan case to
consider this question. In Bressner Radio, the taxpayer received prepayments
on television service repair contracts covering a twelve-month period. The payments were included in monthly income in pro rata fashion, consistent with
statistical data illustrating a reasonably uniform demand for services under
the contract. 3 The Second Circuit held that if the taxpayer demonstrated
its method clearly reflected income, the Commissioner would not have discretion under section 446(b) to reject the method. 64 The court recognized the
difficulty of determining whether the method adopted clearly reflected income, 5 and used the generally accepted accrual accounting principle of matching as its analytical starting point.6
The court had no difficulty in determining that as a financial accounting
matter, the deferral method dearly reflected income because the taxpayer
accurately matched revenues and related expenses. The real issue was whether
the taxpayer's deferral clearly reflected income or was instead purely artificial
59. Id. at 189 n.20.
60. Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956); Beacon Publishing Co. v.
Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955).
61. 353 U.S. at 189 n.20. The Court stated that, unlike facts in the instant case, in
Beacon Publishing performance on subscriptions was usually deferred until the publication
dates after the tax year in question; and in Schuessler services were to be rendered on
specified dates. Id.
62. 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959).
63. Id. at 521.
64. Id. at 522-23. The court relied on I.R.C. § 41 (1939), forerunner of § 446(b). See also
Goodhue, supra note 49.
65. 267 F.2d at 522-23.
66. Id. at 525.
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in light of Michigan.67 The Second Circuit distinguished Michigan as dealing
with a truly artificial system, because the club in Michigan failed to prove the
services were actually rendered uniformly so as to justify the matching of related earnings via the ratable- monthly allocation of revenues. 68 The Second
Circuit stated.that Michigan contemplated a realistic deferral would be permissible.69 The court then held the taxpayer's system did in fact clearly reflect
income for tax purposes. 70
Bressner Radio therefore allowed a taxpayer to use statistically based estimates of both the time and extent of future services to defer and allocate prepaid income when services are to be rendered solely upon customer demand.
The Bressner Radio court ignored footnote twenty of Michigan and the fixed
future date controversy in favor of financial accounting principles of accurate
matching as the standard for its clear reflection analysis. The Supreme Court's
second Trilogy decision, American Automobile Association v. United States

(AAA),71 placed the validity of this approach in serious doubt.
AAA

The facts in AAA were essentially the same as those in Michigan, however,
in AAA the taxpayer supported its monthly pro rata allocation of prepaid
membership dues with statistics evidencing a correlation between ratable
recognition and actual incidence of expenses incurred in rendering service to
members. 72 The taxpayer argued this statistical evidence distinguished him
from the taxpayer in Michigan, who had failed to prove the requisite matching. 3 Agreeing with Bressner Radio, the taxpayer stated the Michigan Court
allowed for a realistic deferral method that accurately matched revenues and
related expenses.7 4
The AAA Court, however, did not characterize Michigan as a failure of
proof case. Instead, the Court said its holding in Michigan that the taxpayer's
deferral was purely artificial was based on its finding that the performance
of services was contingent on a member's demand and was not related to fixed
future dates.7 5 In so characterizing Michigan and citing footnote twenty as
support, the Court indicated exact matching and fixed future dates were
necessary for deferral to dearly reflect income. It follows that the Commissioner would always be within the bounds of his section 446(b) discretion in
rejecting deferral systems relying on statistical data other than fixed future performance dates to project customer demand and accurately match income with
expenses. Commenting on the lower court's finding that AAA's deferral system
agreed with generally accepted financial accounting principles, the Court ap67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 529.
Id.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 529.
367 US. 687 (1961).
Id. at 690.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 691.
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parently prohibited use of statistics when it found them "without determinate
76
significance" and based on inherently undependable "average experience."
The only rationale offered, however, for flatly prohibiting the use of estimates
and statistics was that actual individually incurred expenses varied from
month to month even when averaged, while the recognition of income re7
mained ratably constant.
Some courts78 and commentators 79 have limited the Court's apparent prohibition on statistics to the narrow facts of the case. They argue AAA did not
absolutely reject the use of statistics, but that, as in Michigan, the facts indicated the pro rata allocation of prepaid revenues did not accurately match
revenues and expenses, since expenses were not incurred ratably. AAA's statistics failed because the prepaid revenues were not allocated so as to accurately match revenues with expenses.
One year later the Second Circuit, in Automobile Club of New York v.
Commissioner,80 characterized AAA as decided simply on the taxpayer's failure
to establish an accurate matching of income and expenses and opined that
AAA in no way impaired the vitality of Bressner Radio.8' Bressner Radio, the
Second Circuit stated, was distinguishable because the allocation of prepaid
revenues in accordance with the taxpayer's statistics closely matched expenses
with revenues. 8 2 Most courts and commentators, however, understandably
interpreted AAA as flatly prohibiting all use of estimates and statistics.
Schlude
The third decision of the Trilogy, Schlude v. Commissioner,83 breathed new
76.

Id. at 693. The Court stated:

This is only to say that in performing the function of business accounting the method
employed by the Association is in accord with generally accepted commercial accounting
principles and practices. It is not to hold that for income tax purposes it so clearly reflects income as to be binding on the Treasury. Likewise, other findings merely reflecting
statistical computations of average monthly cost per member on a group or pool basis
are without determinant significance to our decision that the federal revenue cannot,
without legislative consent and over objection of the Commissioner, be made to depend
upon average experience in rendering performance and turning a profit.
Id.
77.

Id. The Court observed:

Indeed, such tabulations themselves demonstrate the inadequacy from an income tax
standpoint of the pro rata method of allocating each year's membership dues in equal
monthly installments not in fact related to the expenses incurred. Not only did individually incurred expenses actually vary from month to month, but even the average
expense varied- recognition of income nonetheless remaining ratably constant.
Id. (emphasis in original).
78. E.g., RCA Corp. v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d
881 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2958 (1982).
79. See, e.g. Seago, What Chance for Prepaid Income Deferrals Based on Statistical
Estimates After RCA Decision, 54 J. TAX. 16 (1981).
80. 304 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1962).
81. Id. at 784.
82. Id.
83. 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
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life into the accurate matching argument and the availability of statistics
to prove such matching. In Schlude, a dance studio sold prepaid dance lesson
contracts for a specified number of hours. Although the contracts designated
the period over which the lessons would be taken, there was no schedule of
specific dates. The studio credited a deferred income account for the amount
prepaid on a particular contract.8 4 At the dose of each year, the number of
hours taught on a contract was multiplied by a designated hourly rate and
the resulting sum was reported as income for that period. If no lessons were
taught on a contract for over a year, an entry would be made cancelling that
contract and recognizing the unearned prepayment as cancellation gain income in that year. 5
The Court, in holding the Commissioner properly exercised his section
446(b) discretion, rejected the taxpayer's deferral system as not clearly reflecting
income.88 As in AAA, the taxpayer's deferral system deferred income for
services to be performed on customer demand, rather than on fixed future
datem.8 7 Apparently relying on the exact matching concept, the Court held that
when services are not to be performed on fixed future dates, the Commissioner
always acts within his discretion in rejecting the deferral system.88
A closer reading of Schlude, however, indicates the absence of fixed future
dates may not have been determinative and a system relying on estimates to
accurately match revenues and expenses might clearly reflect income. The
Schlude Court's concern was not the matching of revenues and expenses relating to hours actually taught under the contract, but instead was the absence
of expenses matching the cancellation gains.8 9 Under financial accounting
principles, when additional services need not be rendered nor expenses incurred to earn income, income should be recognized immediately.
The fatal flaw of the taxpayer's system in Schlude was that at the end of
each period the "studio was uncertain whether none, some, or all of the remaining lessons would be rendered."90 The Court's primary concern was not
that exact matching be achieved, but that any income deferred actually be
earned in the future. The Court found the studio's arbitrary decision of when
to cancel a particular contract objectionable because income could be reported
in a period subsequent to receipt, which bore no economic relationship to the
income reported.91 The solution, the Court stated, would have been to report
income from "estimated cancellations" in the year of receipt, since no additional expenses had to be incurred to earn those cancellation gains.92 The
deferral system's failing could be remedied by the use of accurate statistical
projections of the extent to which contracted-for lessons would actually be
taught.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 130.
at 181-32.
at 135-86.
at 185.
at 136-37.
at 136.

Id.

Id. at 136, n.9.

92. Id.
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The Trilogy's conflicting statements on the use of statistics to clearly reflect
income end in confusion. According to AAA, the use of statistics to project
when prepaid revenues should be matched to future expenses is inappropriate. 93 In Schlude, the Court approved the use of statistical projections as a

valid means of accurately determining the extent of performance of future
services, thereby legitimizing the deferral system. 94 The Court in AAA and
Schlude arguably did not intend fixed future performance dates to be an absolute prerequisite to clear reflection of income. The Court's primary concern
was uncertainty as to the extent of future services that inheres in a deferral
system relying solely on customer demand to allocate prepaid revenues. This
is evidenced by the Court's statement in both AAA and Schlude that the particular deferral systems unacceptably deferred income recognition of prepayments to a taxable period in which "no, some, or all the services paid for
may or may not be rendered." 95 The Court's adoption of fixed future dates as
an instance in which deferral clearly reflects income merely manifests its
concern over the above uncertainty. Where services are to be performed on fixed
future dates, there is no uncertainty: clearly, the entire prepayment will be
earned through future performance.
The Court's focus reflects a concern that the matching concept underlying
accrual accounting be followed. As the degree of certainty attending the
rendition of future services increases, the allocation of revenues to future
periods in which those services are increasingly certain to be rendered achieves
a closer matching of revenues and expenses. Fixed future dates of performance
provide absolute certainty and exact matching, whereas services to be rendered
solely on customer demand, without any statistical projection of the extent of
such demand, results in inaccurate matching due to an impermissible degree
of uncertainty as to whether future services will be rendered.
The issue arguably left unanswered by the Trilogy is the validity of a deferral system whose uncertainty falls somewhere between the two extremes of
fixed future dates and solely on customer demand. More specifically, the issue
is whether a deferral system that, in allocating prepaid revenues to future
periods, relies on accurate statistical projections of customer demand for
services, clearly reflects income. To answer this question, the development of
the law after the Trilogy must be reviewed.
SERVICE AsSERTS ABSOLUTE ANTI-DEFERRAL RuLE

The AAA and Schlude decisions dearly imply that deferral based on the
performance of services on future fixed dates clearly reflects income for tax
purposes. In both cases, however, the Court relied on a broader alternate ground
in upholding the Commissioner's rejection of deferral - Congress' enactment
and subsequent retroactive repeal of section 452, the only Code section to incontestably allow deferral.9 6 In the post-Trilogy years, the Service contended
93.
94.
95.
96.

367 U.S. at 693.
372 U.S. at 135-36.
372 U.S. at 136; 367 U.S. at 692.
See supra note 2.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1982

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [1982], Art. 6
1982]

PREPAID INCOME

that this legislative "rejection" of deferral meant the Commissioner could reject any deferral method as a sound exercise of section 446(b) discretion. 7
The majority in AAA viewed the passage of section 452 as the first legislative declaration specifically permitting deferral accounting for tax purposes.
Congress' repeal of section 452 one year later "was just as clearly a mandate
from the Congress that petitioner's [deferral] system was not acceptable for
tax purposes."98 The Court noted that the enactment of section 455 in 1958,
permitting publishers to defer inclusion in income of prepaid subscriptions,
and Congress' express refusal at that time to allow deferral of prepaid automobile club membership dues, was an indication that Congress was aware of
the deferral problem but chose to limit its permissibility to publishers.99 Such
congressional awareness, along with the fact that by repealing section 452
Congress eliminated the only law incontestably permitting the deferral method,
required the Court to "leave to the Congress the fashioning of a rule which, in
any event, must have wide ramifications." 10 0 Thus, because of the repeal of
section 452 and Congress' limited authorization of deferral thereafter, 1°d the
Court concluded the Commissioner did not abuse his section 446(b) discretion
in rejecting the taxpayer's deferral system.
The Commissioner rested his broad proposition that deferral is never a

valid method for tax purposes upon the AAA majority's interpretation of
congressional action in the deferral accounting area. The Commissioner
contended that in light of the clear congressional mandate emanating from
the repeal of section 452, rejecting the deferral method always lies within his

97. See, e.g., RCA Corp. v. United States, 664 F.2d 881, 889 (2d Cir. 1981) (reserving
comment on this proposition); Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d
1105 (6th Cir. 1969); Decision, Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 58 (1966); Cox v. Commissioner,
43 T.C. 448 (1965); Popular Library, Inc. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1092 (1963).
98. 367 U.S. at 695.
99. Ironically, five weeks after AAA came down Congress enacted § 456, permitting deferral of prepaid membership dues by membership organizations such as those in Michigan
and AAA. Section 456 permits the prepaid dues to be reported on a pro rata basis over the
period in which the services to which the dues relate are required to be performed. However, the reporting of the dues cannot be deferred over a period of more than 86 months.

I.R.C. § 456 (1976).
The House Ways S. Means Committee, in its report accompanying the enactment of § 456,
commented on the Supreme Court's decision in Michigan:
The pro rata allocation of annual membership dues over the 12 months to which the
dues relate may not precisely match the periods in which services are performed for
individual members. Nevertheless, your committee believes that spreading dues income
of these clubs in this manner will more dearly approximate the period in which the
services are rendered than reporting the income for the year of the receipt of the
membership dues.
H.R. REP. No. 381, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961), reprinted in 1961-2 C.B. 390.
While § 456 effectively overrules the AAA decision insofar as it relates to membership
organizations, the Court's decision still applies to all other "prepaid service" scenarios where
deferral is not expressly permitted by statute.

100. 367 U.S. at 697.
101.

See supra note 99,
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broad discretion. For several reasons, the Commissioner's proposed absolute
anti-deferral rule did not constitute a proper reading of the Trilogy.
While the majority in AAA relied on rules of statutory construction in
analyzing section 452's repeal, the AAA dissent investigated the legislative
10 2
history underlying section 452's enactment and subsequent retroactive repeal.
After close scrutiny, the dissent properly concluded the enactment and repeal
of section 452 did not justify the majority's finding of a broad congressional
mandate.10 3 Congress' expressed purpose in enacting section 452 was to bring
tax accounting more nearly into line with accepted business accounting by
permitting deferral.104 Congress felt that but for the improper application of
the claim of right doctrine to accrual taxpayers, section 452 would have been
unnecessary and a proper reading of the 1939 Code would have permitted deferral10 5
The repeal of section 452 did not reflect a change in Congress' belief that
deferral was proper. 1 6 The Secretary of the Treasury requested that Congress
repeal the statute because, due to mechanical problems in the statute, a tremendous loss of revenue would have occurred in the provision's transition
year.10 7 Congress acceded to the Secretary's request but emphasized that the
102. 367 U.S. at 706-08 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The effect of the repeal of a statute
is to destroy its effectiveness and treat it as though it had never existed. lA J. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ff23.33 (C. Sands, 4th ed. 1972). The Service's argument is that prior
to § 452's enactment deferral was not permissible, and therefore repeal of § 452 signaled a
return to the pre-§ 452 viewpoint.
103. 367 U.S. at 710.
104. Id. at 709. See also S. RPr., supra note 1, at 3, quoting from the tax recommendation
in the Presidential Budget Message of 1954.
105. 367 U.S. at 703 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart characterized Congress as
being aware "that the difficulty lay, not with the statute, but with administrative and court
interpretation." Id.
106. Congress also repealed § 462, the "flip side" of deferral, which allowed accrual of a
current deduction for additions to reserves for estimated future expenses. Section 462 came
in with § 452 under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code as part of the attempt to bring tax
and financial accounting more into line. It permitted the "reserve accounting" method
to be elected. More precisely, § 462 permitted an accrual basis taxpayer to deduct reasonable additions to reserves for various types of estimated expenses, where such expenses were
related to income taxed during the year, thereby preventing the double tax benefit that
otherwise would occur via use of § 452 and § 462. Prior to § 462, deductions were only allowed
when all events had occurred which fixed the fact and the amount of the taxpayer's liability.
The deductions newly permitted by § 462 previously were disallowed due to their "contingent"
nature.
107. The mechanical problem referred to was strictly a one-year matter. In the transition
year, 1954, there would have been a "telescoping" of deductions due to 1) the newly allowed
deductions for additions to reserves for future estimated expenses, for those taxpayers
electing the "expense reserve" method, and 2) the deductions for expenses actually incurred
in 1954 by an accrual taxpayer, attributable to income earned in a prior period but not
deductible under old law until the current year. When considering § 452 and § 462, Congress
had contemplated a $45 million revenue loss for fiscal year 1955 as a result of their enactment.
Due to the above "telescoping," however, the Secretary felt that losses could run into the
billions of dollars. Further, he contended that through the manipulation of the nature and
content of contracts, § 452 could be used to achieve the same result were § 462 alone repealed.
S. RFP., supra note 1, at 5. See also Wagman, Sections 452 and 462: Stormy Past but a Bright
Tomorrow, 33 TAxas 711, 715-16 (1955).
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repeal did not signify disapproval of the deferral method.10 8 Indeed, the Senate
Report closed with a renewed call for congruency between tax and business
accounting.1° 9 The Senate Finance Committee implicitly approved the Beacon
Publishingdecision decided between the enactment and repeal of section 452,
by suggesting that all publishers be entitled to defer prepaid subscription income consistent with Beacon Publishing and the Service's previous limited
approval of deferral.-1
The Court's discussion of the section 452 repeal in AAA and Schlude was
unnecessary because in both cases the Court first found the deferral systems
presented were purely artificial and did not clearly reflect income. Once the
Court determined the Commissioner's action was a valid exercise of his section
446(b) discretion no further discussion was necessary. Indeed, Michigan, the

The "telescoping" problem was brought to the attention of Congress during its consideration of § 462, and the statute was modified before being enacted into law. As modified, the
Secretary was given broad discretionary power to control any excessive revenue loss, by requiring the deduction for current expenses actually incurred to be spread out over an extended period of years instead of being deducted entirely in the transition year. The Secretary, however, was dubious of exercising the authority Congress intended him to have and
was fearful that prolonged taxpayer litigation would result from such exercise. As a result of
the Secretary's apprehensions and his desire to have a fresh review of § 452 and § 462, the
committee concluded:
Mour committee (Senate Finance Committee) has reluctantly concluded to report
out the House bill repealing these sections from the effective date of their enactment.
Since the Secretary has not, by regulations, exercised the discretionary limitations which
your committee delegated to him in the law, it is apparent that the loss in revenue
under these provisions may be much larger than was anticipated last year.
S. REp., supra note 1, at 5.
108. In a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the House Ways and Means Committee, the Committee received the following assurance from the Secretary:
Furthermore, the Treasury Department will not consider the repeal of § 452 as any
indication of congressional intent as to the proper treatment of prepaid subscriptions
and other items of prepaid income, either under prior law or under other provisions
of the 1954 Code . . . . It is my understanding that the foregoing is consistent with
the desires of your committee, with which I agree, that the repeal of § 452 and § 462'
should operate simply to reestablish the principles of law which would have been
applicable if § 452 and § 462 had never been enacted.
H.R. REP. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955), reprinted in 1955-2 CJB. 852, 854-55 (emphasis
added).
109. See S. RE., supra note 1, at 6.
110. In I.T. 3369, 1940-1 C.B. 46, 47, the Service stated: "[i]f the publisher uses the
[deferral] . . . of reporting subscription income, all expenses incurred during the year in
which the subscriptions are obtained, which are applicable to the obtaining of the subscriptions, or to the subscriptions themselves, shall be spread allocably over the subscription
periods in the same manner as the subscription income." Id. At the conclusion of its report,
the Committee made clear it expected to report out legislation that would provide proper
substitutes for § 452 and § 462. True to its word, § 455 was enacted three years later permitting deferral of prepaid subscription income. I.R.C. § 455 (1976). Three years later,
§ 456 came into law, permitting deferral of prepaid membership dues income. Id., at § 456.
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first Trilogy case, ignored the repeal of section 452, although the government
briefed this point.,'
Clearly, the congressional mandate the AAA majority drew from the repeal
of section 452 was overly broad, and probably wholly incorrect. Congress
believed that, but for the erroneous application of the "claim of right" doctrine,
deferral was proper and enacted section 452 to reinforce that belief.11 2 The
section was later repealed for reasons unrelated to its professed validation of
the deferral method. 1 3 It seems incongruous to interpret the section 452 repeal as a mandate from Congress that deferral is not valid for tax purposes. In
light of the fact that Congress was aware of the Beacon Publishing decision
when repealing section 452, its desire that the trend of judicial decisions be
allowed to run its course without an inference of disapproval being drawn
from the repeal of section 452 seems to be better read as anything but congressional disapproval of deferral.1 4 At the very least, even if the legislative
history of section 452 does not actually approve deferral, it clearly does not
stand for the broad proposition for which the AAA and Schlude majority cite
it.115

The Court's implication throughout the Trilogy that deferral dearly reflected income when based on fixed future dates further discredits the Commissioner's absolute anti-deferral argument. It is highly unlikely that the
Court's reference to section 452's repeal was intended to prohibit all deferral,
since footnotes in Michigan and AAA specifically refrain from overruling
Beacon Publishing and Schuessler, two cases permitting deferral based on
future fixed dates. A more reasonable interpretation would be that the Court
felt section 452's repeal broadened the Commissioner's section 446(b) discretion, but not to the extent of permitting disallowance of deferrals dearly
reflecting income.116
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Artnell Co. v. Commissioner"- rejects
111. Brief for Respondent at 64-65, Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353
U.S. 180 (1957).
112. In light of the fact that Congress was aware of the Beacon Publishing decision
when repealing § 452, its desire that the trend of judicial decisions be allowed to run its
course without any inference of disapproval being drawn from the repeal seems to be better
read as anything but congressional disapproval of deferral. See supra note 104.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 108.
115. It is likely the Court's discussion of the § 452 repeal was dicta in AAA and Schlude.
In both cases the Court found the deferral systems presented were purely artificial and not
clearly reflective of income, due to the lack of accurate matching of revenues and expenses.
Schlude, 372 U.S. at 135-36; AAA, 367 U.S. at 691.
116. The viewpoint of the Fifth Circuit, for example, follows:
It seems, then, that the Court is for the present taking a middle ground pending
Congressional reform and clarification in this extremely confused area of the law. While
the repeal of sections 452 and 462 does not absolutely preclude deferrals and accruals,
it indicates that the Commissioner should have very broad discretion to disallow such
techniques when there is any reasonable basis for his action.
Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400, 408-09 (5th Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).
117. 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968).
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the Commissioner's absolute and-deferral rule. In ArtnelU, customers bought
season tickets for the Chicago White Sox baseball team admitting them to all
scheduled home games. 118 This factual scenario resembled the fixed future dates
situation, which the Supreme Court earlier implied would dearly reflect income. The Service argued that absent specific statutory authorization, deferral
accounting as a rule must be disallowed." 9 The Tax Court agreed,120 holding
that in light of Congress' limited approval of deferral, the Commissioner had
unreviewable discretion under section 446(b) to reject deferral accounting
where Congress made no contrary provision. 21
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the Trilogy more narrowly than
the Tax Court. Because section 446(b) provides the only statutory authority
for the Commissioner's rejection of deferral accounting, the asserted absolute
anti-deferral rule necessarily presumed that no deferral system could ever dearly
reflect income. Unwilling to read the Trilogy as granting the Commissioner
such unbridled discretion, the Seventh Circuit concluded that rather than a
blanket prohibition, the Court had rejected deferral only when the time and
extent of performance of future services was uncertain.1 22 Even allowing for
the Supreme Court's deferral to Congress to fashion an appropriate rule for
deferral accounting, the Seventh Circuit held that "there must be cases where
deferral accounting so clearly reflects income that the Commissioner's rejection
thereof would be an abuse of his discretion."'123 The court then remanded to
the Tax Court to determine whether the taxpayer's deferral method clearly
2
reflected income.' '
The Artnell decision makes three important points. First, no absolute rule
of law prohibiting deferral exists, because the Commissioner does not have unreviewable discretion to reject all deferral systems. 25 Second, in the fixed future
dates scenario deferral clearly does reflect income. 2 Third, when reviewing
the Commissioner's section 446(b) discretion, a court must determine whether
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 982.
Id. at 983.
Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 411 (1967).
Id. at 418.

122. 400 F.2d at 983-84.
123. Id. at 985.
124. On remand, the Tax Court took a rather radical approach:
As we understand the opinion of the Court of Appeals, we are to examine the White
Sox' method of accounting and to determine whether such method clearly reflects
its income, without any consideration of those reasons which led to the adoption of a
different rule for tax accounting. In other words, we are to judge the White Sox'
method by the standards commonly used for financial or commercial accounting

purposes.
29 T.C.M. 403, 405 (1970) (emphasis added). The Tax Court found that while the taxpayer's method did not perfectly match income with expenses, it did so better than the
Commissioner's proposed method, and held for the White Sox. Id. at 406. No other court has
followed this approach and relied exclusively on financial accounting notions in reviewing
the Commissioner's exercise of his § 446(b) discretion.
125. 400 F.2d at 984.
126. Id. at 984-85.
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the system in question clearly reflects income.127 Most importantly, the Artnell
decision implied that a deferral system not based on fixed future dates might
be acceptable if it clearly reflects income 2 s 8
Other courts have subsequently concurred with Artnell in rejecting the
Commissioner's proposition that, absent specific congressional authorization,
deferral is per se invalid. To date, the Tax Court, 29 Court of Claims, 130 and
the Third1 3 ' and Fifth Circuits1 32 all agree no absolute prohibition against de-

ferral exists, while only the Sixth Circuit 3 concurs with the Service's viewpoint.
Indeed, the Service seems to recognize the fallacy of its own argument, as
demonstrated by its limited acceptance of deferral in Revenue Procedure 7121 .134 That Revenue Procedure permits a limited two-year deferral of prepayments for future services, provided certain conditions ensuring time and extent
of future performance are met. 135 Revenue Procedure 71-21 blatantly contra127. Id. at 985.
128. Id. at 984-85.
129. Prior to a recent decision, the Tax Court clearly recognized the Artnell exception.
"Since Artnell Co., this Court has indicated that it will not follow the rationale of that case
unless the facts present a certainty, of performance or fixed dates, such as was presented in
Artnell Co." T.F.H. Publications, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 623, 644 (1979), afj'd by unpublished opinion, Docket No. 79-2486 (3d Cir., May 27), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 320 (1980).
The Tax Court in T.F.H. contrasted, and impliedly disassociated itself from, its prior
opinions citing the Trilogy as establishing a rule of nondeferral. See, e.g., Angelus Funeral
Home v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 391, 399 (1967); William 0. McMahon, Inc. v. Commissioner,
47 T.C. 58, 62 (1966); Cox v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 448, 455-56 (1965).
A recent decision, however, Chesapeake Financial Corp. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 869
(1982), creates doubt as to the Tax Court's current stance. Since the facts of the decision
did not merit deferral (the taxpayer did not provide a breakdown of when services were to
be rendered), the court's rejection of the taxpayer's system as not "clearly reflecting" income
was to be expected. In distinguishing the instant facts from those in Artnell and Boise Cascade, the Tax Court implied it was undecided as to whether it recognized the exceptions
provided in those cases when it slated: "We need not decide whether to adopt the rationale
of the Seventh Circuit and the Court of Claims .... " Id. at 881. Further evidence of the Tax
Court's indecision is evidenced by the following:
In contrast to Artnell and Boise Cascade, the present case does not provide the occasion
to ask whether the Supreme Court trilogy "left an opening for a decision that under
the facts of a particular case, the time and extent of future performance might be so
certain, and the matching of income and expenses so demonstrable, that deferral would
clearly reflect income."
Id. (quoting Malman, Treatment of Prepaid Income - Clear Reflection of Income or
Muddied Waters, 37 TAX L. REv. 103, 120 (1981)).
130. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 585 F.2d 988 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Boise
Cascade Corp. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1367 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
131. See T.F.H. Publications, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 623 (1979), aff'd in an unpublished opinion, Docket No. 79-2486 (3d Cir., May 27), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 320 (1980).
132. Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1970).
133. See Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1969).
134. Rev. Proc. (71-21), 1971-2 C.B. 549.
135. Section 3.02 of Rev. Proc. 71-21, id., provides that:
An accrual method taxpayer who, pursuant to an agreement (written or otherwise),
receives a payment in one taxable year for services, where all of the services under
such agreement are required by the agreement as it exists at the end of the taxable year
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dicts the Commissioner's argument that AAA stands for the per se invalidity of
deferral absent specific congressional authorization, since the procedure was
issued without such authorizations.
Limits on the Permissible Use of the DeferralMethod
Artnell's interpretation of the Trilogy established that no absolute rule prohibiting deferral absent congressional authorization exists, and deferral based
on rendition of services on fixed future dates dearly reflects income and is
therefore acceptable for tax purposes. The next logical question is how much
further can the deferral method validly be extended? As stated in Michigan, deferral based not on fixed future dates but solely on customer demand is clearly
unacceptable due to inadequate matching of revenues and related expenses.
An acceptable middle ground, however, between the fixed future dates and
solely on customer demand extremes may exist. For example, where services
are to be rendered on customer demand, but the time and extent of such
demand is projected through the use of statistical forecasts with reasonably precise accuracy, the deferral system could clearly reflect income.
Whether such a deferral method is acceptable for tax purposes depends on
how the Trilogy is interpreted. As discussed above, a narrow reading of AAA
and Schlude indicates the Court did not intend fixed future dates to be wholly
determinative of a deferral system's validity, but rather to exemplify the accurate matching required for deferral accounting to clearly reflect income.
The Court's footnote reference in Schlude to the taxpayer's failure to project
estimated contract cancellations indicates the AAA Court did not intend to
prohibit the use of statistics to accurately match revenues and expenses.13 6 The
Service broadly interpreted AAA and Schlude as rejecting all use of statistics to
achieve accurate matching and clear reflection; only deferral based on fixed
future dates is sufficient to achieve clear reflection of income. Recently, the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, and the Second

of receipt to be performed by him before the end of the next succeeding taxable year,
may include such payment in gross income as earned through the performance of the
services .... However, if the inclusion in gross income of payments received is properly
deferred under the preceding sentence and for any reason a portion of such services
is not performed must be included in gross income in such next succeeding year, regardless of when (if ever) such services are performed.
Id. Rev. Proc. 71-21 most likely does not represent a trend towards the government recognizing that deferral in some instances "clearly reflects" income. Following hard on the heels
of Artnell, the Rev. Proc. is more likely an attempt by the Service to minimize the damage
done to its position by the Seventh Circuit in Artnell.
136. Inadvertently, the IRS in Rev. Proc. 71-21 lent support to this conclusion. In permitting a limited deferral or prepayments for future contingent services, the Service stated:
In any case in which an advance payment is received pursuant to an agreement which
requires the taxpayer to perform contingent services, the amount of an advance payment which is earned in a taxable year through the performance of such services may
be determined (a) on a statistical basis if adequate data are available to the taxpayer.
Id. § 3.06, 1971-2 C.B. 549 (emphasis added).
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Circuit, each tried to resolve this interpretive question, with widely disparate
results.
137
RCA Corporationv. United States:
A NEw APPROACH

RCA, an accrual basis taxpayer, sold prepaid television service contracts to
purchasers of new televisions. Under these agreements, the purchaser paid RCA
a lump sum at the time of tile purchase, and RCA agreed to service the television anytime trouble developed during a contract term from three to twentyfour months.13 Because services were to be rendered upon customer demand
rather than at regular intervals, the extent of future services was uncertain. RCA
allocated the prepayment so that the portion attributable to the costs of selling
and processing the contract, plus a profit, was recognized immediately as income.
The remainder of the prepayment, the portion to be earned through future
performance under the contract, was initially credited to a deferred income
account. 39
Based on past experience, RCA had developed statistical projections reflecting the percentage of service calls expected to be made each month under
contracts of varying lengths. At trial, these projections were found to correlate
to actual service calls with a very high degree of precision.'" 0 RCA utilized these
projections to provide the basis for its monthly allocation to income of a portion
of its prepaid receipts from the sale of contracts of each length. As a result, a
portion of the prepayments were reported as income in tax years subsequent
41
to their receipt. '
The Commissioner, after asserting that absent congressional authorization
deferral is invalid, concluded RCA's deferral system did not clearly reflect income and rejected it under his section 446(b) authority. 142 At trial, the government argued the Trilogy establishes as a matter of law that deferral does not
clearly reflect income when prepayments are received for services to be
rendered at unspecified future dates, regardless of how accurately it matches
revenues and expenses.'1 43 RCA contended the Trilogy, in conjunction with the
Anderson case, simply requires that a deferral system achieve accurate matching
44
of revenues and related expenses to clearly reflect income.
The district court, limiting AAA and Schlude to their respective facts, rejected the government's position. The proper test under the statute, the court
concluded, was whether the accounting method in question clearly reflects in137. 499 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 2958 (1982).
138. 499 F. Supp. at 508.
139. Id.
140.
141.

Id. at 518-19.
Id. at 508-09.

142. Id. at 509-10.
143. The government in such argument implicitly recognized the Artnell fixed future
dates exception, but contended that such exception represents the furthest permissible extension of the deferral concept. Id.
144. Id. at 509.
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come.1 45 That question is determined from how accurately the taxpayer's
method matches revenues with the expenses of producing the revenue 46 As to
the fixed future date requirement, the court stated it was significant but not
solely determinative in appraising whether revenues and related expenses are
4
accurately matched.
According to the district court, Michigan rejected a deferral system because
the taxpayer failed to prove accurate matching,148 but inferred that deferral

could be upheld if there was evidence that the system accurately matched income with expenses. The court then focused on AAA's apparent blanket proscription of the use of statistics and discredited it on two grounds. First, the
Supreme Court's only rationale for the prohibition in AAA was that the particular taxpayer's pro rata deferral did not accurately match his revenues and
expenses.' 49 This enabled the RCA district court to limit AAA's rejection of
statistics to its facts.- 0 Second, the Court noted in Schlude that if the dance
studio had made an accurate statistical projection of estimated contract
cancellations, the fatal uncertainty as to the extent of future services could
have been remedied and accurate matching achieved.153 The district court concluded the reference in AAA to estimated cancellations as a cure for the dance
studio's uncertainty dispelled any notion that the Court intended to bar the
use of such projections.
The district court's rationale for holding RCA's deferral method acceptable
dearly was not novel. Although RCA was the first post-Trilogy case specifically
allowing deferral based on statistics, the rationale applied by those post-Trilogy
cases allowing deferral based on fixed future dates is equally applicable. Those
decisions, consistent with the RCA district court, stress accurate matching as
the cornerstone of clear reflectionJ 52 The Tax Court, on remand from the
Id. at 516.
146. Id. at 518. The court observed:
145.

The proper test, under the statute, remains whether the accounting method in
question "dearly reflects income"-that is, in our view, whether it ensures, with
reasonable precision, that deferred revenues are included in gross income in ta& yeais
subsequent to that in which they are received only in proportion to the related
services performed, and expenses incurred, during those tax years.
Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 511-12. The court stated:
In our view, the subsequent (post-Michigan) decisions of the Supreme Court establish that the fact that the services paid for are not to be performed on fixed dates
is not in and of itself determinative, but is significant only insofar as it throws light
on the question whether the challenged accounting method is "artificial" because it
fails adequately to ensure that receipts are included in gross income in any tax year
only in proportion to related expenses incurred during that year.
Id.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 512.
Id. at 512-13.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 515 (citing Schlude, 372 U.S. at 135-36).
See ipfra note 167.
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Seventh Circuit in Artnell to determine whether the taxpayer's deferral system
clearly reflected income, stated its duty was to determine whether the taxpayer's
method achieved the matching of revenues and expenses required for financial
accounting purposes. 153 Similarly, the Court of Claims found a taxpayer's deferral method clearly reflected its income because it achieved the "desideratum
of accurately matching costs and revenues.' ' 154 What is extraordinary about
RCA was its willingness, in light of AAA, to allow the use of statistical projections to prove the required matching.
The government appealed RCA to the Second Circuit, 55 which had decided Bressner Radio twenty-two years earlier. Unfortunately for RCA, the
Second Circuit's views on deferral had changed radically since that decision.
Displaying an astonishing amount of deference to the Commissioner's judgment, the Second Circuit ruled the district court had misinterpreted its duty in
RCA. The court concluded a reviewing court should not apply its own
opinion in determining whether a deferral system clearly reflected income, but
should defer to the Commissioner's decision unless it is without legal basis.' 5"
The Second Circuit concluded the lower court had given "too little weight to
the objectives of tax accounting and to the Commissioner's wide discretion in
implementing those objectives.'

1 7
5

After reviewing the Trilogy and its underlying policy consideration, the
Second Circuit held the law adequately supported the Commissioner's action. 158
The primary policy consideration of the Trilogy, the court reasoned, was that
deferral based on customer demand presents an impermissible degree of uncertainty as to the extent future services will in fact be rendered. 59 In light of
such uncertainty, "the Commissioner was not required to subject the federal
revenue to the vicissitudes of RCA customers' demands for service."160 The
court relied on Schlude and AAA in concluding that a deferral system relying
on statistical projects and experiential assumptions was inherently uncertain
to an impermissible degree. Although the Second Circuit found RCA's predictions more accurate than those in AAA and Schlude, "they were predictions
nonetheless, and the Commissioner was not required to accept them as determinants of the federal revenue."' 6'1 Accordingly, the court concluded the
Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in ruling the projections did not
evidence accurate matching and determining RCA's accounting method did
2
not clearly reflect income.16
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

29 T.C.M. 403, 405 (1970).
530 F.2d 1367, 1377 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976). See supra note 49.
664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 886.
Id.
Id. at 888.
Id.

160.

Id.

161. Id. at 889.
162. The Second Circuit withheld opinion on the government's "no deferral absent
Congressional authorization" argument, in view of its disposition of the other issues before
it. Id. at 889 n.10. The court's failure to dismiss this argument, long discredited by other
courts, was certainly consistent with the remainder of its pro-government opinion.
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District Court v. Second Circuit:Which
Has the Better Analysis?
The conflicting analytical frameworks of the RCA district court and Second
Circuit decisions reflect different interpretations of the judiciary's duty when
reviewing an exercise of the Commissioner's section 446(b) discretion. The
district court's approach requires the reviewing court to analyze the particular
accounting method at issue. If the method matches revenues and related
expenses with sufficiently precise accuracy, then it clearly reflects income. If the
taxpayer's method dearly reflects income, the Commissioner is precluded from
exercising his section 446(b) authority to reject it.1 63 The validity of the Commissioner's exercise of discretion is determined by reference to whether the
accounting method in question dearly reflects income.
In contrast, the Second Circuit determines whether the Commissioner has
abused his discretion by reference to prior case law and policy considerations.
This method totally bypasses investigation into the accuracy of the taxpayer's
accounting method in favor of determining whether the Commissioner's action
had an adequate basis in law. By upholding the Commissioner's rejection of
RCA's highly precise statistical projections, the Second Circuit effectively established a rule of law that deferral based on statistical projections, no matter
how accurately revenue and related expenses are matched, never clearly reflects
income.
The likely rationale for the Second Circuit's approach to deferral of prepaid service income is administrative convenience. The government strongly
emphasized this factor in both AAA and Schlude.164 Administrative considerations help explain the Trilogy's aversion to uncertainty in the performance of future services. Fixed future performance dates eliminate the
need to verify statistical projections underlying deferral and thereby facilitate
administration of the accounting method.16 5 However, as one commentator has
noted: "It is not at all clear that discrimination solely on the basis of what is
administratively practicable could be supported by appeal to the only standard
163. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
164. See American Auto Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. at 692; Brief for Respondent at
42-43, Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
There could be an enormous burden of evaluating and verifying complex statistical
evidence submitted by millions of taxpayers in an endless variety of business contexts to
prove they had reliably "related and matched" present income with estimated future expenses, or present expenses with estimated future income. Revenue agents could not only
become involved in technical accounting problems in order to determine the validity
and accuracy of the taxpayer's estimates in the first instance, but could be obliged to
re-audit the taxpayer's accounts in later years to ascertain whether subsequent business
experience corresponds with the taxpayer's previous estimates.
Id.
165.

See Comment, RCA Corp. v. United States: The Taxation of Income From Future

Services, 1 VA. TAx Rxv. 189, 206 (1981). This comment was written before the Second
Circuit's decision in RCA; the Second Circuit's analysis bore uncanny resemblance to that
of this comment, which concluded that the Commissioner should have the authority to reject
the use of statistics simply on administrative convenience grounds.
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made explicit in the statute- that accounting methods must 'clearly reflect
income' for federal tax purposes."' 166 Section 446(b) and the case law defining
the bounds of the Commissioner's discretion focus on whether an accounting
system clearly reflects income, rather than on whether the Commissioner will
have a difficult time administratively making that same determination.
Review of earlier pro- and anti-deferral decisions supports the district
court's analytical framework and reveals the Second Circuit's approach grants
excessive deference to the Commissioner. In all three of its decisions, the Supreme Court, in determining whether the Commissioner had validly exercised
his section 446(b) discretion, decided the accounting method in question was
purely artificial and did not clearly reflect income because revenues and related expenses were not accurately matched. The Court therefore upheld the
Commissioner's exercise of his section 446(b) discretion. The Court's determination of the validity of the Commissioner's exercise of section 446(b) discretion
hinged on its own analysis of whether the taxpayer's accounting method
clearly reflected income, which in turn depended on the accuracy with which
the system matched revenues and related expenses.
Subsequent pro-deferral decisions have also focused on clear reflection and
accurate matching as the cornerstone of their analyses of section 446(b) discretion. These cases' 6" agree that section 446(b) calls for a factual determination
of whether an accrual system employing the income deferral technique clearly
reflects income. Once the taxpayer carries the burden of proving his method
clearly reflects income, it necessarily follows that the Commissioner abused his
section 446(b) discretion in rejecting it.
The Second Circuit's approach is very similar to that of courts in the postTrilogy, pre-Artnell period. These courts, interpreting the Trilogy as establishing an absolute rule that deferral could not clearly reflect income, refused
to examine a taxpayer's deferral system for clear reflection. Artnell corrected
this analytical error. Recognizing the key to clear reflection was accurate matching, the Seventh Circuit held some deferral systems must so accurately match
revenues and related expenses that to conclude such systems do not clearly reflect income would be an abuse of discretion. Deferral based on fixed future
dates did accurately match revenues and expenses; thus, on remand the Tax
Court held the Commissioner abused his discretion.
The rule of law established by the Second Circuit, that deferral based on
statistical projections, regardless of how accurate, can never clearly reflect income, is analogous to the pre-Artnell rule. It attempts to preclude courts reviewing the Commissioner's exercise of his section 446(b) discretion from
examining a deferral system to determine whether it accurately matches
revenues and related expenses. If accurate matching, however, is truly the key
166. See Oberdorfer & Michelman, A Commentary on Tax Administration and Accrual
Accounting, 12 AM. U.L. Rav. 135, 146 (1963). Because Mr. Oberdorfer was Assistant Attorney
General of the United States, in charge of the Tax Division of the Justice Department, and
argued the government's case in AAA and Schlude, this article offers an excellent insight into
the government's argument in those decisions.
167. See Morgan Guaranty Trust, 585 F.2d at 997; Boise Cascade, 530 F.2d at 1377-78;
Mooney Aircraft, 420 F.2d at 406; Artnell, 400 F.2d at 983; Bressner Radio, 267 F.2d at 523.
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criterion in determining whether a deferral system dearly reflects income, the
Second Circuit's blanket proscription cannot stand. To paraphrase Artnell,
there must be situations where the deferral technique, relying on accurate
statistical projections, will so clearly reflect income that it will be an abuse of
discretion if the Commissioner rejects it.
CONCLUSION

The courts and the Service are in general agreement that the 'deferral
technique is a valid derivative of accrual accounting in limited circumstances.' 68 No appellate court, however, has yet accepted the RCA district
court's proposition that statistically-based estimates of future services accurately allocate prepaid income when the services are rendered solely on
customer demand. Whether such a system is valid for tax purposes depends
on how the Trilogy is interpreted.
Fixed future performance dates ought not to be determinative of whether
a deferral system clearly reflects income. Reading the Trilogy as requiring fixed
future dates, and thus limiting the Artnell exception strictly to its facts, is an
overly broad interpretation. A court reviewing the Commissioner's exercise of
his section 446(b) discretion must determine whether the deferral system before it clearly reflects income. This inherently subjective inquiry precludes the
imposition of absolute criteria such as fixed future dates. Courts should not
state that, as a rule of law, deferral based on fixed future dates always clearly
reflects income while deferral based on statistical projections never does. If the
Supreme Court intended the Trilogy to pronounce this rule of law, it did so
without congressional authorization. Section 446(b) only requires that a deferral system clearly reflect income; the Court should not engraft onto the
statute additional requirements such as fixed future dates. Therefore, the
better view of the Trilogy is that the Court intended fixed future dates be
an indicia of, not a prerequisite to, clear reflection of income.
Post-Trilogy cases concur with this narrow interpretation of the Trilogy. 169
These cases demonstrate the Supreme Court's primary concern was the lack of
168. See supra note 48; infra note 169. The limited circumstances referred to are
basically fixed future performance dates.
169. In addition to the RCA district court, the Court of Claims, the Tax Court, and the
Fifth Circuit have indicated that they do not regard fixed future dates as a prerequisite to
valid deferral accounting. In Boise Cascade, the Court of Claims permitted deferral where
the taxpayer was contractually bound to render engineering services, and such obligation was
fixed and definite. The Court of Claims emphasized that the taxpayer before ithad a fixed
obligation to perform its services without the uncertainty of performance so prominent in
the Trilogy. In no way, the court concluded, was the taxpayer's performance of his services
dependent solely upon customer demand. 530 F.2d at 1378.
In T.F.H., the petitioner purchased the printing and publishing assets of a corporation,
and as part of the purchase price gave the corporation a credit for future advertising in the
petitioner's publication. After holding that the advertising credit was taxable income to the
petitioner as a prepayment for future advertising, the Tax Court decided that the credit was
immediately includible in the petitioner's income. In rejecting the petitioner's attempted deferral, the Tax Court noted that "certainty of performance is lacking as well as a predetermined schedule of performance." 72 T.C. at 645. For the Fifth Circuit's viewpoint, see
Mooney Aircraft, 420 F.2d at 406.
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certainty that prepaid services would in fact be rendered. 7 0 When future performance is secured pursuant to a fixed and definite contractual obligation,
certainty of performance exists and deferral has been permitted.' 7 ' It requires
no great leap of faith by the courts to recognize that the requisite certainty can
also be established by statistical projections of customer demand, provided
these projections are shown by experience to predict with reasonable precision
the extent of future performance. Systems such as that employed by RCA
should be acceptable for tax purposes. Taxpayers, however, should be aware
that no federal appellate court has yet accepted the above conclusion. Until the
RCA district court's analysis is adopted, a taxpayer's knowledge that he is
theoretically correct may be little solace.
GARY

J.

COHEN

170. In AAA, the Court voiced its concern over "[a]n accounting system which defers
receipt, as earned income, of dues to a taxable period in which no, some, or all of the services
paid for by those dues may or may not be rendered." 367 U.S. at 692. In Schlude, "at the
end of each period ....
the studio was uncertain whether none, some, or all of the remaining lessons would be rendered." 372 U.S. at 136.
171. In Boise Cascade, the taxpayer had such a fixed contractual obligation, and the
Court of Claims permitted the deferral. 530 F.2d 988, 991 (1976). In T.F-H., the taxpayer's
obligation to perform advertising services was subject to the customer's demand, and therefore
deferral was denied. "Although the pertinent provision in the agreement refers to a monthly
average of 10 pages of advertising, there is no requirement that Miracle (the party entitled
to the services) place any advertising at all in petitioner's publications. Consequently,
certainty of performance is lacking ....
" 72 T.C. at 645.
The Tax Court, as evidenced by the above, appears to accept the Boise Cascade notion
that certainty of performance is sufficient to permit deferral. The Tax Court, however, rejected the use of "monthly averages" to achieve such certainty; a requirement to perform, the
Tax Court felt, was necessary to achieve the requisite certainty.
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